toorcon san diego Aug 28th - Sep 3rd. Dig Deep into FlexiSpy for Android by Kai Lu(@k3vinlusec).Quick Conference Review
HITB Singapore August 21-25. The Original Elevat0r - History of a Private Jailbreak by Stefan Esser. The Nightmare of Fragmentation: A Case Study of 200+ Vulnerabilities in Android Phones by BAI GUANGDONG and ZHANG QING.
Tencent Security Conference, August 30-31. Pointer Authentication by Robert James Turner. Finding iOS vulnerabilities in an easy way by Tiefel Wang and Hao Xu. Bare-metal program tracing on ARM by Ralf-Philipp Weinmann.
44con 13-15 September London, UK. Inside Android's SafetyNet Attestation: What it can and can't do lessons learned from a large scale deployment by Collin Mulliner.
BalCCon2k17 Novi Sad, Vojvodina, Serbia. September 15-17. Mobile phone surveillance with BladeRF by Nikola Rasovic.
T2 October 26-27 Helsinki, Finland. Breaking Tizen by Amihai Neiderman.
DeepSec Vienna 13-17 November. Normal permissions in Android: An Audiovisual Deception by Constantinos Patsakis. How secure are your VoLTE and VoWiFi calls? by Sreepriya Chalakkal.
It was good to see everybody in Vegas, even better meeting new people. Especially some folks I wanted to meet for a long time. I had a good time at WOOT, meeting old friends was especially good. Maybe it helped that it was in the CanSecWest hotel. I link a few relevant papers below.
Stefan Esser is running a kickstarter for an iOS Kernel Exploitation Training Course for Development of a freely available online iOS kernel exploitation training course based on iOS 9.3.5 on 32 bit devices. If you are into iOS security you should support Stefan's project!
Ralf is on point as usual:
Pictures of the month:
Exhibit A) Our communities are tribalized: https://t.co/e1uATFviYT (JTAG on iPhone 4S BB + exploitation of baseband vulns from SIM, in 2014)— Ralf (RPW) (@esizkur) August 19, 2017
Burner kiddies at defcon be like: pic.twitter.com/3QyPTuJwFg— the grugq (@thegrugq) July 22, 2017
Some Chinese USB adapters have a hidden SIM that will send a text message with GPS coordinates to track an unknowing victim… https://t.co/PK5bpkaBmv— Dimitri Bouniol (@dimitribouniol) August 9, 2017
中国のUSB充電アダプター型盗聴器が先進的すぎる。— 若ちゃん (@wk_tyn) August 8, 2017
😂 accident happens #htc #privacy #security #Android pic.twitter.com/AJRAJRO1xK— nixCraft (@nixcraft) July 19, 2017
BootStomp: On the Security of Bootloaders in Mobile Devices (paper)
Fixes in iOS 10.3.3
Reviewing the Security of ASoC Drivers in Android Kernel
Hacking Cell Phone Embedded Systems
Intercept, modify, repeat and attack Android's Binder transactions using Burp Suite
Seccomp filter in Android O
This source code was obtained by reversing a sample of SLocker. It's not the original source code
Trust Issues: Exploiting TrustZone TEEs
Universal Android SSL Pinning bypass with Frida
USING AN RTL-SDR AS A SIMPLE IMSI CATCHER
BROADPWN: REMOTELY COMPROMISING ANDROID AND IOS VIA A BUG IN BROADCOM'S WI-FI CHIPSETS
Surveillance: German police ready to hack WhatsApp messages
Google May Have Just Uncovered An Israeli Surveillance Start-Up Spying On Androids
Gas Pump Skimmer Sends Card Data Via Text
Defeating Samsung KNOX with zero privilege (slides)
Path of Least Resistance: Cellular Baseband to Application Processor Escalation on Mediatek Devices
Port(al) to the iOS Core
New Adventures in Spying 3G & 4G Users: Locate, Track, Monitor
Ghost Telephonist Link Hijack Exploitations in 4G
OnePlus 2 Lack of SBL1 Validation Broken Secure Boot
iOS 10.3.2 XPC Userland Jailbreak Exploit Tutorial - CVE-2017-7047 by Ian Beer (Video)
Samsung: Trustonic t-base TEE does not perform revocation of trustlets
A (hopefully) generic unpacker for packed Android apps
The original elevat0r jailbreak exploit explained
Tinker is a hot-fix solution library for Android, it supports dex, library and resources update without reinstall apk.
Shattered Trust: When Replacement Smartphone Components Attack (paper)
Patch iOS Apps, The Easy Way, Without Jailbreak
Android Banking Trojan misuses accessibility services
Get details and download apps from https://play.google.com by emulating an Android (Nexus 5X) device by default.
vTZ: Virtualizing ARM TrustZone (paper)
objection - runtime mobile exploration
Xposed for Nougat & abforce Submodule Explained, and Why It's Worth Waiting for rovo89's Full Release
A Linux kernel IPC firewall and logger for Android and Binder
White-Stingray: Evaluating IMSI Catchers Detection Applications (paper)
BootStomp: a bootloader vulnerability finder
iOS 11 has a 'cop button' to temporarily disable Touch ID
Simple tool to dynamically discover hidden fastboot OEM commands based on static knowledge
Blue Pill for your Phone
Android Instant Apps: Best practices for managing download size (who has played with instant apps yet?)
Decrypt the iOS SEP
How much does your phone know about you?
Identifying and Evading Android Protections
Breaking Mobile App Protection Mechanisms
Isolation of HALs in Android O
ANTIVIRUS FOR ANDROID HAS A LONG, LONG WAY TO GO
Fake Snapchat in Google Play Store
Next-generation Dex Compiler Now in Preview
Detecting Android Root Exploits by Learning from Root Providers (paper)
Downgrade Attack on TrustZone (paper)
Testing Biometric Authentication
shadow v2 public release
Android O security changes
SonicSpy: Over a thousand spyware apps discovered, some in Google Play
SMS touch sends customer information and SMS messages over a cleartext network
ZIMPERIUM blog post that describes how the Zero Packet Inspection (ZPI) approach is trained
Using Hover to Compromise the Confidentiality of User Input on Android (paper)
Various Scripts for Mobile Pen-testing with Frida
circuit board (PCB) schematics for 30-pin iPod serial debugging
SS7 Attacker Heaven turns into Riot: How to make Nation-State and Intelligence Attackers' lives much harder on mobile networks (slides)
This blog post is to provide some more details about my idea that was mentioned on Risky Business #463 by Haroon Meer.
What are Canary Tokens (from Thinkst).
You'll be familiar with web bugs, the transparent images which track when someone opens an email. They work by embedding a unique URL in a page's image tag, and monitoring incoming GET requests.
Imagine doing that, but for file reads, database queries, process executions, patterns in log files, Bitcoin transactions or even Linkedin Profile views. Canarytokens does all this and more, letting you implant traps in your production systems rather than setting up separate honeypots.
Canary tokens are a free, quick, painless way to help defenders discover they've been breached (by having attackers announce themselves.)
The idea: Embed Canary Tokens into binaries (or application data) to help identify reverse engineering of your software.
Every reverse engineer looks for unique information (often just strings) in the target binary to help understand it. The strings are thrown into Google (or other search engines) with the hope to get additional information. The returned information can be extremely helpful to determine what the software is, what other code is linked in, what versions, etc. Everybody who reverse engineers stuff does this! I personally don't reverse engineer for a living so I asked around to confirm that professionals actually do this (I already knew the answer anyway!).
- Embed unique looking strings into the binary
- Stand-up web page that contains the string, log access to that page (alert on access)
- Make Google crawl that page (various tools for that)
- Ship software
This is pretty straight forward, right? But do you care about somebody who just ran strings on your binary? Likely not! So what's next?
Many applications protect their code and other assets that come with it through different kinds of methods (called obfuscation techniques for this article - even not all of it will be actual obfuscation). The next step for the RE-canaries is to generate canaries and embed them into each obfuscation layer. If someone accesses a more obfuscated canary you know that a certain level of effort was put into reversing your app. This part is really where the creativity of the RE-canary deployment comes into play. This will be highly depended on the specific software, on the protection mechanisms used, the language and framework that app is written in and so on. Mobile apps (I'm a mobile app guy, yeah!) contain API endpoints and URLs and maybe some hardcoded credentials (tokens of course). The URLs have the advantage that you wouldn't need to put up a website. You just make them accessible and add logging and alerting.
The final part of this is automation. You want to automate canary creation and embedding into your built process, so that you can generate unique canaries with each built or major release or whatever fits your software.
In the end it will likely happen that advanced REs are going to use an anonymization service such as TOR when searching for strings or trying out URLs (specifically for URLs!). In this case at least you will know that someone is looking at your stuff and passed a certain skill/time/effort threshold, which I guess in most cases is enough information.
That's it! This idea was inspired heavily by Haroon Meer's Canarytokens a great free service that I use once in awhile!
Comments and feedback is welcome via the usual channels.