since I always rant about how I don't like biometrics in smartphones some people have asked me to formulate what I actually would like to see to happen in this area.
My dislike for biometrics is that you cannot change your password anymore because your password is your finger, eye (iris), or face. That means you basically show you password to everybody. A good example of this is here: Politician's fingerprint 'cloned from photos' by hacker.
The second part of the problem is that many biometric systems can be easily bypassed, some face recognition systems even with a picture shown on a smartphone screen.
My main issue is that biometric systems can be bypassed by forcing the owner of the device to unlock it. This can be done without leaving evidence, a funny example of this issue: 7-Year-Old Boy Uses Sleeping Dad's Finger To Unlock iPhone. Also see this interesting case: Court rules against man who was forced to fingerprint-unlock his phone.
The main argument I always hear is that people who wouldn't set a password (or use just a simple PIN) are using biometrics and therefore are more secure now with the help of biometrics. The kid from the previous story wasn't stopped by biometrics it was just as good as not having a password.
What would have stopped the kid from unlocking his dad's phone? A simple timeout! Basically what I want to see is a timeout for your biometrics. Once you entered your password you can unlock your phone using biometrics, after a specific amount of time you have to re-enter your password and cannot unlock the device using biometrics. With a timeout of say 30 minutes to one hour you can prevent simple attacks while still being able to use the convenience of biometrics. Apple recently introduced the SOS mode that will also disable biometric authentication until you enter your password. I wish this was taken one step further and let you set a timeout.
I personally see biometrics on a smartphone as a pure convenience feature and treat it as a weak security feature. I only use it for ApplePay.
I think it is pretty bad to get people used to biometric authentication, Apple may get it right but other companies wont. Normal users can't determine this easily. Also how much did the additional hardware components cost to implement fingerprint authentication or face recognition. FaceID doesn't use a normal camera so there are definitely additional costs that you as the user have to pay for this convenience feature.
Face recognition in consumer products also gets people to accept this as an normal everyday thing and thus helps the argument for face recognition being used in surveillance.
Chaos Computer Clubs breaks iris recognition system of the Samsung Galaxy S8 in May 2017
Chaos Computer Club breaks Apple TouchID iPhone 5s in 2013
ekoparty Sep 27-29, Buenos Aires. Blue Pill for your phone by Oleksandr Bazhaniuk. Unbox Your Phone - Exploring and Breaking Samsung's TrustZone Sandboxes by Daniel Komaromy. Inside Android's SafetyNet Attestation: Attack and Defense by Collin Mulliner. How to cook Cisco: Exploit Development for Cisco IOS by George Nosenko. Bypass Android Hack by Marcelo Romero.Some comments on BlueBorne: I've been involved with Bluetooth security since like forever (not active in the last 10+ years). The early Bluetooth vulnerabilities were mostly logic bugs and issues such as missing authentication. Bluetooth devices could not be set to hidden and would always show up when scanning for devices. Stuff like that. BlueBorne is different as it is a remote exploitable memory corruption vulnerability in Linux, Android, and Windows. This is quite a novelty since we haven't seen a bug that is more ore less the same on two platforms. Even more interesting is that this bug is pre-authentication and gives you kernel privileges (code exec in the kernel).
Virus Bulletin 4-6 Oct, Madrid Span. Last-minute paper: Publishing our malware stats by Jason Woloz (Google) [This is about Android Malware]. Android reverse engineering tools: not the usual suspects by Axelle Apvrille.
In theory this set of vulnerabilities can be bad, bad. In practice the issue is much less of an issue. Exploit mitigations and built variances help mitigating the risk. Devices are not always visible therefore the attacker cannot easily find your device and attack it.
Also see: Hackers Could Silently Hack Your Cellphone And Computers Over Bluetooth.
FaceID: I think it is a really horrible idea! Do not put biometric systems in to consumer products ever! I will not buy products with mandatory biometrics so far iOS allows me to turn it off and use a passphrase - thats why I even consider buying iOS devices. I hate this change -- biometrics are bad.
Huh, here I was looking to get a phone similar to Walmarts in-store model... And eBay just has their actual in-store model... Perfect! pic.twitter.com/sq4pUtCBe3— Tim Strazzere (@timstrazz) September 17, 2017
https://t.co/zqdwIa27IR— sp (@LambdaCube) August 28, 2017
"Certified devices are also required to ship without pre-installed malware"
A good requirement IMHO. 😛
I agree ^^^
Badass! @cmwdotme just demoed his new company's ARM hypervisor -- capable of running iOS instances on virtual iPhone6 hardware #TenSec pic.twitter.com/vb9ld8cjIE— Ralf (RPW) (@esizkur) August 31, 2017
Android Oreo feature spotlight: Changes to Verified Boot won't allow you to start a downgraded OS https://t.co/9RZqASUyeb pic.twitter.com/Zz6OD4xliv— Android Police (@AndroidPolice) September 5, 2017
SELinux in Android Oreo or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Attributes (presentation)
Kernel Driver mmap Handler Exploitation (paper)
BabelView: Evaluating the Impact of Code Injection Attacks in Mobile Webviews (paper)
AndroidXRef now with Android O/8
Now the native-shim loader can create VM's for ART based Android devices by rednaga
Good thread about the Android Key Store API
IDA AArch64 processor extender extension: Adding support for ARMv8.1 opcodes
INJECTING MISSING METHODS AT RUNTIME
Oppo/Oneplus .ops Firmware decrypter
Android Hardware-backed Keystore (docs)
Samsung to Launch Mobile Security Rewards Program, Welcoming Security Research Community
Android 8.0 includes the following security-related changes
WHAT'S NEW IN KNOX 2.9?
ANDROID O AND DEX 38: DALVIK OPCODES FOR DYNAMIC INVOCATION
The public release of shadow v2 jemalloc exploitation tool with support for Android (both ARM32 and ARM64)
Making it safer to get apps on Android O
Dig Deep into FlexiSpy for Android
Tool for leaking and bypassing Android malware detection system
iOS 8.4.1 32 bit jailbreak