33c3 Hamburg, Germany 27-30 December. Downgrading iOS: From past to present by tihmstar. A look into the Mobile Messaging Black Box by Roland Schilling and Frieder Steinmetz. Dissecting modern (3G/4G) cellular modems by LaForge and holger. Geoloation methods in mobile networks by Erik.
Shmoocon Washington D.C. January. A Context-Aware Kernel IPC Firewall for Android - David Wu, Sergey Bratus.
Black Hat ASIA March 2017. FRIED APPLES: JAILBREAK DIY by Alex Hude and Max Bazaliy. MASHABLE: MOBILE APPLICATIONS OF SECRET HANDSHAKES OVER BLUETOOTH LE by Yan Michalevsky. REMOTELY COMPROMISING IOS VIA WI-FI AND ESCAPING THE SANDBOX by Marco Grassi.
I had to skip the November update due to a long overdue vacation. Playing with iOS webviews also did cost some time. Writing this blog becomes more and more time consuming since for some parts I would rather spent time on research than writing about other peoples research. Will see next year if I continue doing this or not. I'm doing this since January 2009 so it has been a few years.
Opcde ConferenceSamsung confirms it will render the US Note 7 useless with next update since the owners don't seem to care to return the phones to Samsung even tho they would get a replacement device. This is kind of hilarious.
Browser based iOS 9.3.x jailbreak (64bit only) it has been a while.
Chinese company installed secret backdoor on hundreds of thousands of phones
Here is the BLU R1 blind system command execution via Adups from July of this year - anyone think they care? pic.twitter.com/veUMGD8zSy— Tim Strazzere (@timstrazz) November 22, 2016
Recently the topic of SMS 2FA came up again. While I agree that SMS is not the most secure version of 2FA it is far far better then not providing any 2FA mechanism for your service.
Seems like the right ordering, but when deployment is 98% < 2% < .5% < .01% complaining about SMS security is pretty silly. https://t.co/5ex3naa5a5— Alex Stamos (@alexstamos) December 1, 2016
Oxygen 9.0.3 allows to brute force a passcode for any Windows Phone 8 device from its physical dump!
Android system_server Code Loading Bypass
"Root" via dirtyc0w privilege escalation exploit (automation script) / Android (32 bit) Raw
Practical Attacks Against Privacy and Availability in 4G/LTE Mobile Communication Systems (paper)
JTAGing Mobile Phones (from August)
The limitations of Android N Encryption
The fight against Ghost Push continues
BitUnmap: Attacking Android Ashmem
Saving Data: Reducing the size of App Updates by 65% (looks interesting)
More Than 1 Million Google Accounts Breached by Gooligan
Telstra is switching off their GSM network
Qualcomm has a Bug Bounty now
Nintendo has a Bug Bounty now
Secure Rom extraction on iPhone 6s
Android Security Bulletin - December 2016
HackingTeam back for your Androids, now extra insecure!
SunShine 3.4.18 has been released. Bring Support for Android 7.x.x and latest HTC 10 updates
A detailed security assessment on Android Full Disk Encryption (paper)
BitUnmap: Attacking Android Ashmem
Fuzzing Android OMX (slides)
Anonymous web-based SMS
Mobile Network Codes (MNC) for the international identification plan for public networks and subscriptions (According to Recommendation ITU-T E.212 (09/2016))
Call me maybe: Exploiting iOS WebViews to force automatic FaceTime calls
Android Banking Malware Masquerading as Email App Targets German Banks
Second Chinese Firm in a Week Found Hiding Backdoor in Firmware of Android Devices
Powerful backdoor/rootkit found preinstalled on 3 million Android phones
RAGENTEK ANDROID OTA UPDATE MECHANISM VULNERABLE TO MITM ATTACK
New Reliable Android Kernel Root Exploitation Techniques (slides)
Analysis of iOS.GuiInject Adware Library
Android Security Bulletin - November 2016
HelDroid: Dissect Android Apps Looking for Ransomware Functionalities
Rooting Every Android From Extension To Exploitation by Di Shen (slides)
Mobile Espionage in the Wild Pegasus and Nation-State Level Attacks (slides)
The Android Security Center
Technical Analysis of the Pegasus Exploits on iOS (paper)
Just a place to dump the cdma data I collected while at Defcon 2016
CRiOS: Toward Large-Scale iOS Application Analysis (paper)
Exploring LTE security and protocol exploits with open source software and low-cost software radio by Roger Jover (slides)
Your smartphone is a civil rights issue (TED talk)
Receive SMS Online
Android wear MiTM
*droid: Assessment and Evaluation of Android Application Analysis Tools (paper)
Using Google Fi on an iPhone
iOS WebView auto dialer bug
I finally made it to Kiwicon this year (special thanks to vt for dragging us out!). I even managed to get a talk in (con bucket list--) making the trip even sweeter.
The conference was absolutely awesome. Well organized, friendly people (staff and attendees!), and a perfect venue. The conference had about 2500 attendees which seemed like a good fit for the venue. I liked the overall program, the intermissions and speaker introductions were absolutely fantastic. In my opinion Kiwicon is at the sweet spot on the issues of size and target audience. It is big enough to be attract different kinds of folks and it is small enough to find people and hangout. I also really love single track conferences!
Sadly it was announced that this was the last Kiwicon, I'm happy to have made it to the last one! Thanks!
Below a few photos and videos from Kiwicon, the official Kiwicon photos are here.
Ohai KiwiCon pic.twitter.com/lZT7ldKw18— Collin Mulliner (@collinrm) November 16, 2016
TL;DR: iOS WebViews can be used to automatically call an attacker controlled phone number. The attack can block the phone's UI for a short amount of time and therefore prevent the victim from canceling the call. The bug is an application bug that likely is due to bad OS/framework defaults. One major issue with this vulnerability is that it is really easy to exploit. App developers have to fix their code as soon as possible. The Twitter and LinkedIn iOS apps are vulnerable (other apps might be vulnerable too). Demo videos here: Twitter and LinkedIn (embedded videos are below on this page).
About a week ago (on a Friday) I read an news post [1,2] about a guy who got arrested for accidentally DoSing 911 by creating a web page that automatically dialed 911 when visited it from an iPhone. This was most likely due to a bug with the handling of TEL URI [4,5]. I immediately thought about a bug I reported to Apple in late October 2008 . I couldn't believe this bug has resurfaced so I investigated. The article said something about posting links on Twitter.
On Nov. 6th I updated the bug report to Twitter to add the UI blocking issue (continue reading) and uploaded a video. Today Twitter simply closes the bug as a duplicate without any comment. While this might be a simple duplicate they should have an interest in playing nice and being thankful to those who report bugs they find in their spare time. Because of this action I decided to post the full details of the issue today.
During the weekend I took some time to further investigate the issue. I determined that this might be a general issue with iOS apps the use WebViews to display content. I tested a few popular apps I had installed. Vulnerable apps need a way for users to post web links that will be opened in a WebView inside the app itself. Apps that open links in mobile Safari or Chrome would not be vulnerable (I tested this). One app I tested fairly early was the LinkedIn app since LinkedIn basically is social media for the business context. People can send messages and post updates. Updates usually are text and link. I posted a link and clicked it and yes it dialed my other phone (demo video below).
I wanted to submit the bug to LinkedIn and found that they have a bug bounty program. Unfortunately it was a private bounty and you would only be added if you previously submitted bugs. I tried to get around it but it didn't work. After some thinking I decided to not report it to LinkedIn privately but openly (parallel to this blog post). It is 2016 after all and if they don't want to add me to their program that is their choice. In general I will likely not report bugs outside of a bug bounty program if a private bug bounty program exists.
Another weekend comes I have some time and started playing with the bug again. Actually I started looking at my PoC from 2008 while trying to figure out if I report the bug to LinkedIn or not. After playing around for a bit I more or less get my old PoC working with the Twitter and LinkedIn apps. WOW!
Taking one step backwards. The original bug I reported to Twitter was triggering a phone call by visiting a website that redirect to a TEL URL. One could do this with various techniques such as: http-meta refresh, iframe, setting document.location, window.location, or an HTTP redirect (Location header). This would simply dial a number. The victim would see the dialer and the target number on the screen and of course could just cancel the call by pressing the big red button. Just causing the call is already bad since an unobservant person will be baffled (why is my phone dialing some number).
The beauty of my 2008 bug was that I could block the phone's UI for a few seconds and therefore prevent the user from canceling the call. I managed to abuse exactly the same trick to block the UI that I used in 2008. The trick is to cause the OS to open a second application while the phone is dialing the given number. Opening applications is pretty straight forward, you open a URL that causes the OS to spawn another application. This can be anything from the messages app (via the SMS: URL) or iTunes (via the itms-apps: URL). You can pretty much get any application to launch that has a URI binding. In 2008 I used a SMS URL with a really really long phone number to block the UI thread. My best guess on how this works is that the IPC subsystem actually has difficulties to move several kilobytes of URL data through the various layers into the app and the target app might also not be super happy about really large URLs. I ended-up with the code below. The code uses the combination of meta-refresh tag and window.location to execute the attack. The codes delays setting the window.location by 1.3 seconds to guarantee that the dialer is executed first. The delay cannot be too long otherwise the WebView will not execute the URL handler for launching the messages app. Basically you have to get the timing just right.
The PoC to trigger this bug.
Below two video demonstrations of this attack. You can clearly see that the UI is not responsive for a short amount of time. The time is long enough to make somebody pickup on the other side (especially service hot lines automatically pickup).
Normal good app behavior:
Apps should normally check the URL schema before executing it and show the user a pop-up dialog before executing an app on the device. Some examples are shown below:
Mobile Safari asking before calling the Apple Support number. This is how good apps should behave!
Dropbox showing a warning but not showing the target number. Ok but could be better.
The Yelp app normally behaves like Safari but if you hit it with an HTTP redirect it does not show the target number. I just included this for the fun of it.
App developers should review their use of WebViews to determine if they are vulnerable to this attack. Vulnerable apps need to be fixed. Service providers like Twitter and LinkedIn can inspect links posted to their sites for containing malicious code and prevent those links from being posted to their service.
Apple should change the default behavior of WebViews to exclude execution of TEL URIs and make it an explicit feature to avoid this kind of issues in the future. I reported this issue to Apple.
 Bug Bounty Hunter Launches Accidental DDoS Attack on 911 Systems via iOS Bug (softpedia)
 iPhone hack that threatened emergency 911 system lands teen in jail (ars technica)
 Here my post to full-disclosure in Nov. 2008 after Apple fixed the bug in iOS 3.0 : iPhone Safari phone-auto-dial vulnerability (original date: Nov. 2008)
 Original TEL URI schema RFC2806 URLs for Telephone Calls
 Updated TEL URI schema RFC3966 The tel URI for Telephone Numbers
TL;DR: Google Fi on an iPhone is iMessage plus Google Wifi calling with awesome international coverage.
Google Project Fi is super interesting as it provides an actual low cost alternative to other carriers especially if you travel. The free data-only SIM is also a nice add-on.
Project Fi is exclusively targeting users of Google Nexus Android devices and you actually need one of the supported phones to activate the SIM which can be ordered on the Fi website.
I currently use an iPhone SE (mainly due to the device's tech specs and form-factor - I can't stand phablets!) so I was curious if I can just buy a Google Fi SIM and use it in an iPhone or any other phone actually. Of course I'm not the first person to think about this, but the only decent article on this topic is this one. Sadly most articles that are returned for a search on iPhone Google Fi are just totally useless. Even this article is not good.
I decided to just order Google Fi and a data-only SIM and give it a try. I used a Nexus 5x that I have access to for activating the SIM card. The activation process is really simple. Basically you need to put the SIM card into a compatible phone and install the Google Fi app. Done.
The activated SIM card can be put into any other phone, I tried an iPhone 5c and it just works. You automatically get the APN settings (the mobile data settings) pushed to your phone. Cellular data immediately works! Voice calls work too.
Wifi calling also works, although it (obviously) only works via the Hangout app but it does work. I put my phone into airplane mode and called the number from another phone and yea it rings.
The only service that is a bit unsatisfying is SMS (text messaging). The default option for Google Fi is to send and receive SMS via Google Hangout. Google Hangout exists for iOS and if you login with your Google Account that is associated with your Google Fi service you just install Hangouts and everything just works! If you actually want to use the iOS Messages app you can deactivate SMS via Hangout in the Hangout app on your phone. This will allow you to send and receive SMS via Messages. The only issue here is that incoming SMS messages get some Google specific data attached, as shown below. This is a little annoying but is only on incoming messages (you don't look like an idiot when sending messages to other people). Most of my contacts are on iMessage anyway these days so this is a non issue. Also I'm ok with using Hangouts for SMS since yea iMessage and other messaging apps.
The switch to change between native SMS and Hangout SMS the switch above it does the same for voice calls (to enable Wifi calling).
The broken* incoming SMS, the ~Dgr... is added by Google Fi, this does not show up in Hangouts. Other people have reported that this just went away after short time.
Things that don't work? switching between T-Mobile, Sprint, and US Cellular since this is done via the Google Fi app on Android devices (I actually don't have any idea about this yet).
Altogether Google Fi looks pretty cool and works with an iPhone (besides the hick-up with SMS). iMessage works (it is just an Internet service after all). Wifi calling via Hangouts is nice.
If you are a hardcore iOS/Mac user Google Fi is too much Google for you. I'm a Linux user with an iPhone so Google Fi makes a lot of sense. Desktop calls and SMS via Hangouts is a nice thing to have in addition to iMessage.
Google Fi on an oooold phone (Android 4.0). Hangouts seem to work fine too.
*The data is a BASE64 encoded blob, no obvious data after looking at a bunch of them of an hour or less.
PacSec October, Tokyo. Demystifying the Secure Enclave Processor by Mathew Solnik. Finding Vulnerabilities in Firefox for iOS by Muneaki Nishimura.
ACM CCS Workshop on Security and Privacy in Smartphones and Mobile Devices (SPSM) October, Vienna Austria. All talks are related to mobile security.
O'Reilly Security Conference October, NYC. Securing 85% of the world's smartphones by Adrian Ludwig. How Plantronics honed its headsets to create secure wearables by Erik Perotti.
SyScan360 November, Shanghai. Browser Bug Hunting and Mobile by Francisco Alonso and Jaime Penalba. Demystifying the Secure Enclave Processor by Mathew Solnik. Running Code in the TrustZone Land by Edgar Barbosa. Analysis of iOS 9.3.3 Jailbreak & Security Enhancements of iOS 10 by Team Pangu. Security Vulnerabilities on Online Payment: Summary and Detection by Zhang Qing and Bai Guangdong.
KiwiCon November Wellington, NZ. Let's do the Timewarp Again by Karit.
I'm going to be at the O'Reilly Security Conference on Monday the 31st (maybe also the other days). I super excited to speak at KiwiCon this year!
I'm interested in Google's Project Fi does anybody have insights into using it with non Android phones? I've found several posts on this topic but nothing convincing yet. Posts also seem conflicting.
Best of mobile security in pictures:
I've seen this warning a lot in the last couple of weeks while traveling:
This is the real reason for the Galaxy Note 7 recall
While searching for the link to the recall:
Android Banking Trojan Tricks Victims into Submitting Selfie Holding their ID Card
Kwetza: Infecting Android Applications
Pork Explosion Unleashed - Manufacturer Backdoor in the Foxconn Android bootloader
Decap of a SIM card (video)
Android Qualcomm GPS/GNSS Man-In-The-Middle (bug that is fixed now)
KNOXout - Bypassing Samsung KNOX (paper)
Android CVE PoCs for the October bulletin
Osmocom 3G circuit switched voice support with IuCS and Iuh
Multiple Backdoors found in D-Link DWR-932 B LTE Router (hardcoded admin:admin and root:1234)
BlackBerry axes smartphone business
How to keep your Android phone safe from prying eyes
Xiny Android trojan evolves to root phones and infect system processes
IMSI Catcher Report Calls for Transparency, Proportionality, and Minimization Policies
The Messenger Shoots Back: Network Operator Based IMSI Catcher Detection (paper)
How to wipe your phone (or tablet) for resale
attack against compromised Apple accounts to perform SMS spamming
Android Premium SMS Warning Message Manipulation (small android bug, now fixed)
Nexus Support Lifecycle
Google has less control over Pixel devices than people claimed. HTC still signs the bootchain. (via @jcase)
Talk is Cheap, Show Me the Code - How we rooted 10 million phones with one exploit (slides)
The new Android system permissions model analysis and early warning (in Chinese)
Android full-disk encryption: a security assessment (paper)
Android cryptfs.bt for 101editor
iOS9 iCloud backup retrieval proof of concept
Black Hat EU November, London UK. ARMAGEDDON: HOW YOUR SMARTPHONE CPU BREAKS SOFTWARE-LEVEL SECURITY AND PRIVACY Speaker: Clementine Maurice, Moritz Lipp. DETACH ME NOT - DOS ATTACKS AGAINST 4G CELLULAR USERS WORLDWIDE FROM YOUR DESK Speaker: Bhanu Kotte, Dr. Silke Holtmanns, Siddharth Rao. MOBILE ESPIONAGE IN THE WILD: PEGASUS AND NATION-STATE LEVEL ATTACKS Speaker: Max Bazaliy, Seth Hardy. POCKET-SIZED BADNESS: WHY RANSOMWARE COMES AS A PLOT TWIST IN THE CAT-MOUSE GAME Speaker: Federico Maggi, Stefano Zanero. ROOTING EVERY ANDROID: FROM EXTENSION TO EXPLOITATION Speaker: Di Shen, Jiahong (James) Fang. SIGNING INTO ONE BILLION MOBILE APP ACCOUNTS EFFORTLESSLY WITH OAUTH2.0 Speaker: Ronghai Yang, Wing Cheong Lau. STUMPING THE MOBILE CHIPSET Speaker: Adam Donenfeld. WIFI-BASED IMSI CATCHER Speaker: Piers O'Hanlon, Ravishankar Borgaonkar.The most interesting read this week was The bumpy road towards iPhone 5c NAND mirroring a paper by Sergei Skorobogatov. In this paper he shows how to implement a NAND mirroring attack against an iPhone 5C. The basic idea behind this attack is erase the PIN failure counter between each set of tries to avoid the artificial brute force delay and to avoid data deletion after N failed PINs. The paper goes into great detail on various problems he encountered while implementing the attack. I highly recommend reading this paper. The picture below is taken from this paper.
PacSec Tokyo Japan, October. Demystifying the Secure Enclave Processor by Mathew Solnik.
Google's Project Zero now has an Android "Prize" for achieving RCE on a Nexus device with only knowing it's email address or phone number. Apparently you can't use a BTS (via @jduck) for this attack. Overall this looks interesting, I wonder if anybody is going to claim the money soon. Announcement: Project Zero Prize.
iCloud, iHack, iSpam
Android Premium SMS Warning Message Manipulation
tool to inspect, dump, modify, search and inject libraries into Android processes.
How My Rogue Android App Could Monitor & Brute-force Your App's Sensitive Metadata
APK Signature Scheme v2
Just One Photo Can Silently Hack Millions Of Androids (@TimStrazz)
Parse the Qualcomm DIAG format and convert 2G, 3G and 4G radio messages to Osmocom GSMTAP for analysis in wireshark and other utilities.
PEGASUS iOS Kernel Vulnerability Explained by Stefan Esser
Undocumented Patched Vulnerability in Nexus 5X Allowed for Memory Dumping via USB
VB2016 preview: Mobile Applications: a Backdoor into Internet of Things?
Hiding root with suhide
Xiaomi Can Silently Install Any App On Your Android Phone Using A Backdoor
Reverse Engineering Xiaomi's Analytics app
A Case of Misplaced Trust: How a Third-Party App Store Abuses Apple's Developer Enterprise Program to Serve Adware
File-Based Encryption in Android 7
Linux Security Summit Videos a lot is Android relevant
Harvesting Inconsistent Security Configurations in Custom Android ROMs via Differential Analysis (paper)
suhide v0.51 released
Introducing BLESuite and BLE-Replay: Python Tools for Rapid Assessment of Bluetooth Low Energy Peripherals
Samsung Android Security Updates - September
A Survey on Android ELF Malware
Keeping Android safe: Security enhancements in Nougat
Nexus Device Downloads via jduck @ droidsec
Black Hat EU November: ARMAGEDDON: HOW YOUR SMARTPHONE CPU BREAKS SOFTWARE-LEVEL SECURITY AND PRIVACY by Clementine Maurice and Moritz Lipp. DETACH ME NOT - DOS ATTACKS AGAINST 4G CELLULAR USERS WORLDWIDE FROM YOUR DESK by Bhanu Kotte, Siddharth Rao and Silke Dr Holtmanns. POCKET-SIZED BADNESS: WHY RANSOMWARE COMES AS A PLOT TWIST IN THE CAT-MOUSE GAME by Federico Maggi and Stefano Zanero. STUMPING THE MOBILE CHIPSET by Adam Donenfeld.
DerbyCon September: Beyond The ?Cript: Practical iOS Reverse Engineering by Michael Allen. AWSh*t. Pay-as-you-go Mobile Penetration Testing by Nathan Clark. Breaking Android Apps for Fun and Profit by Bill Sempf.
AppSec USA November: QARK: Android App Exploit and SCA Tool by Tushar Dalvi and Tony Trummer. SecureMe - Droid: Android Security Application by Vishal Asthana and Abhineet Jayaraj. OWASP Reverse Engineering and Code Modification Prevention Project (Mobile) by Dave Bott and Jonathan Carter. ShadowOS: Modifying the Android OS for Mobile Application Testing by Ray Kelly.
Apple now has a bug bounty program. Details were presented at Black Hat in Ivan Krstic's talk BEHIND THE SCENES OF IOS SECURITY. Also see Starting this fall, Apple will pay up to $200,000 for iOS and iCloud bugs (via Ars).
Motorola confirms that it will not commit to monthly security patches. This is pretty bad since I actually liked their Pure Edition devices (devices that basically are just AOSP).
Protecting Android with more Linux kernel defenses. They added some features from Grsecurity. This makes me happy.
Google's Android has gotten so out of control that $55 billion Salesforce had to take drastic measures, basically Salesforce in the close future will only support specific Samsung Galaxy and Nexus devices. This is an interesting way to deal with the very diverse Android ecosystem.
Pegasus Spyware / Trident for iOS was based on 3 vulnerabilities unsurprisingly a WebKit memory corruption, a Kernel info leak, and a kernel memory corruption. The spyware was capable of accessing text messages, iMessages, calls, emails, logs, and more from apps including Gmail, Facebook, Skype, WhatsApp, Viber, Facetime, Calendar, Line, Mail.Ru, WeChat, Surespot, Tango, Telegram, and others. (Source: Lookout Technical Report).
Oversec.io seems to implement our idea of mobile OTR on top of any messenger app. Oversec still looks very beta and I haven't tried it out. If anybody has tried it I would like to hear about it.
Pictures of the month:
Technical Analysis of Pegasus Spyware (pdf)
Chainfire suhide tries to hide your Android root access
Android: protecting the kernel (slides)
Wie das BKA Telegram-Accounts von Terrorverdaechtigen knackt (German)
Hackers accessed Telegram messaging accounts in Iran - researchers (same as a above but in English)
Stumping the Mobile Chipset (Qualrooter) (slides)
Analysis of multiple vulnerabilities in different open source BTS products
gpapi (node lib for talking to Play Store)
Demystifying the Secure Enclave Processor (paper)
CopperheadOS ART no longer attempts to use executable code from /data/dalvik-cache, only boot.art
The slide and exploit of: A Way of Breaking Chrome's Sandbox in Android
Adaptive Kernel Live Patching: An Open Collaborative Effort to Ameliorate Android N-day Root Exploits (slides)
iOS 10 - Kernel Heap Revisited (slides)
Hacking Soft Tokens (Android) (slides)
Understanding Dalvik Static Fields part 2 of 2
Attacking BaseStations (slides)
GODLESS Mobile Malware Uses Multiple Exploits to Root Devices (android)
Android Binder Firewall (slides / paper / source)
ARM is bought by SoftBank
iREVERSE ENGINEERING AND EXPLOITING SAMSUNG'S SHANNON BASEBAND (tools)
LTE security, protocol exploits and location tracking experimentation with low-cost software radio (paper)
BtleJuice: The Bluetooth Smart MitM Framework (slides)
CuckooDroid: Automated Android Malware Analysis
Stagefright: An Android Exploitation Case Study (slides from usenix WOOT)
Tracking the Trackers: The most advanced rogue systems exploiting the SS7 Network today
SS7 Security : Putting the pieces together
ARMv8 Shellcodes from A to Z (paper)