Black Hat ASIA Singapore March 28-31. FRIED APPLES: JAILBREAK DIY by Alex Hude, Max Bazaliy, Vlad Putin. ANTI-PLUGIN: DON'T LET YOUR APP PLAY AS AN ANDROID PLUGIN by Cong Zheng, Tongbo Luo, Xin Ouyang, Zhi Xu. REMOTELY COMPROMISING IOS VIA WI-FI AND ESCAPING THE SANDBOX by Marco Grassi. 3G/4G INTRANET SCANNING AND ITS APPLICATION ON THE WORMHOLE VULNERABILITY by Guangdong Bai, Zhang Qing. MOBILE-TELEPHONY THREATS IN ASIA by Lion Gu, Marco Balduzzi, Payas Gupta. MASHABLE: MOBILE APPLICATIONS OF SECRET HANDSHAKES OVER BLUETOOTH LE by Yan Michalevsky.
CanSecWest Vancouver Canada, March 15-17. Qidan He : Pwning Nexus of Every Pixel: Chain of Bugs demystified. Logic Bug Hunting in Chrome on Android by Georgi Hershey & Robert Miller.
Zer0Con Seoul, Korea April 13-14. Ian Beer : Through the mach portal.
OsmoCon (Osmocom Conference) 2017 is the first technical conference for Osmocom users, operators and developers! April 21, Berlin. All about Osmocom!
HITB Amsterdam April 13-14. FEMTOCELL HACKING: FROM ZERO TO ZERO DAY by JeongHoon Shin. CAN'T TOUCH THIS: CLONING ANY ANDROID HCE CONTACTLESS CARD by Slawomir Jasek. EXTRACTING ALL YOUR SECRETS: VULNERABILITIES IN ANDROID PASSWORD MANAGERS by Stephan Huber, Steven Artz, Siegfried Rasthofer. HUNTING FOR VULNERABILITIES IN SIGNAL by Markus Vervier.
Opcde Dubai, UAE April 26-27. Practical attacks against Digital Wallet by Loic Falletta.
I took a way too long break again. So many things happen in the world of mobile security every week. I really wish I had more time for this. I also have a bunch of small things I need to put on this blog but I think they are too specific for the news and will likely get their own posts.
Some news from MWC (I didn't attend):
First the BlackBerry KEYone a new Android-based phone with a physical keyboard. Other then the BB Priv the KEYone's keyboard is fix and doesn't slide. Movable parts are really not a good idea, they break way too fast. In my opinion this device looks super solid and likely will be supported longer than the average flagship phone from other manufacturers (data on this would be awesome).
Nokia released 3 new Android phones the 3 (MTK), 5 (QCOM) and 6 (QCOM). The phones seem to run Android N without any modifications or vendor crap. Very low price (230Euro for the 6). The bottom of their website specifically says: You get an experience that's focused and clutter-free, and we'll make sure you keep getting regular updates, so you'll always stay on top of features and security. that is what you should expect in 2017.
The Android Devices Security Patch Status page is an awesome resource to determine if a specific device from a specific vendor has been patched and when the patch was released. From the page: This list is Prepared to Serve as a Quick reference to identify which Device is being actively maintained by the Vendor.. This is super useful, thanks!
Xiaomi launching own SoC for Android phones-upgradable baseband with fake base station detection capabilities. IMSI catchers r threat now ;) pic.twitter.com/S0hzDBIiQd— Ravishankar Borgaonk (@raviborgaonkar) March 2, 2017
Apple 0day is expensive. https://t.co/F1UEUU0s3r— Collin Mulliner (@collinrm) February 22, 2017
MOSEC mobile security conference in June in Shanghai. This seems to be the 3rd year of the conference. There is no schedule yet.
The story of the day Vault 7: CIA Hacking Tools Revealed. Vault 7: CIA Hacking Tools Revealed : iOS Exploit list. Yes, the CIA uses n-day exploits! The Android exploits.
They talk about Android, Defcon, and backdooring your repo? ;-)
Pic of the month:
ENISA: Smartphone Secure Development Guidelines
Android Security Bulletin - March 2017
Android Security Bulletin - February 2017
Vault 7: CIA Hacking Tools Revealed
Multi-BTS with Osmocom and a single UmTRX
Obfuscation-Resilient Privacy Leak Detection for Mobile Apps Through Differential Analysis Paper and Tool
Booting into fastboot mode Instructions for all Nexus devices
TROOPERS17 GSM Network - How about your own SMPP Service?
MaMaDroid: Detecting Android Malware by Building Markov Chains of Behavioral Models paper
Exploiting Android S-Boot: Getting Arbitrary Code Exec in the Samsung Bootloader (1/2)
Android ransomware requires victim to speak unlock code
Hacking Android phone. How deep the rabbit hole goes.
Sunny with a chance of stolen credentials: Malicious weather app found on Google Play 5k installs via Google Play!
iOS keychain items used to persist after app uninstall. As of iOS 10.3 beta 2, deleting app deletes keychain items via @hubert3
SunShine 3.4.27 is out - Bringing unlock support for Droid Turbo on 6.0.x
Cellular re-broadcast over satellite
Identifying Rebroadcast (GSM) also linked in post above
ios-triage - Node.js cli for iOS incident response. Program will extract, process and report (including diffs) on iOS device and app telemetry.
Remote control: Companies blur lines over who owns devices
Shodan.io iOS App
Analysis of iOS.GuiInject Adware Library
Patching and Re-Signing iOS Apps
Lifting the (Hyper) Visor: Bypassing Samsung's Real-Time Kernel Protection
Android ransomware repurposes old dropper techniques
Deobfuscating libMobileGestalt keys
Samsung: Stack buffer overflow in OTP TrustZone trustlet
How easy it would be to hack Trump's phone by my friend Zach aka @quine
iOS 10.2 Yalu Jailbreak Now Supports All 64-bit Devices except iPhone 7 and iPad Air 2
Android bootloader (aboot) parser
Tracking Android Security Update across Devices
SAMSUNG KNOX 1.0 ECRYPTFS KEY GENERATOR WEAK ENCRYPTION
Deep Analysis of Android Rootnik Malware Using Advanced Anti-Debug and Anti-Hook, Part II: Analysis of The Scope of Java
Black market Blackphones get sent a kill message that bricks them
iOS/MacOS kernel memory corruption due to userspace pointer being used as a length
Update on the Fancy Bear Android malware (poprd30.apk)
An Analysis of the Privacy and Security Risks of Android VPN Permission-enabled Apps (paper)
Charger Malware Calls and Raises the Risk on Google Play
Secrets leak in Android apps online service to test APKs
26 security issues in major Android password manager apps
Easy 4G/LTE IMSI Catchers for Non-Programmers (paper)
App-in-the-Middle Attack Bypasses Android for Work Secure Framework
Android FRIDA: Add support for enumerateLoadedClasses() on ART
Android: Inter-process munmap in android.util.MemoryIntArray
Owning a Locked OnePlus 3/3T: Bootloader Vulnerabilities
Binary based obfuscation in a way of CTF kids. We obfuscate your apps, support both iOS/Android.
Android (Huawei) privilege escalation in EMUI keyguard app via loading shellcode in theme pack
The Story of Firefox OS
33c3 Hamburg, Germany 27-30 December. Downgrading iOS: From past to present by tihmstar. A look into the Mobile Messaging Black Box by Roland Schilling and Frieder Steinmetz. Dissecting modern (3G/4G) cellular modems by LaForge and holger. Geoloation methods in mobile networks by Erik.
Shmoocon Washington D.C. January. A Context-Aware Kernel IPC Firewall for Android - David Wu, Sergey Bratus.
Black Hat ASIA March 2017. FRIED APPLES: JAILBREAK DIY by Alex Hude and Max Bazaliy. MASHABLE: MOBILE APPLICATIONS OF SECRET HANDSHAKES OVER BLUETOOTH LE by Yan Michalevsky. REMOTELY COMPROMISING IOS VIA WI-FI AND ESCAPING THE SANDBOX by Marco Grassi.
I had to skip the November update due to a long overdue vacation. Playing with iOS webviews also did cost some time. Writing this blog becomes more and more time consuming since for some parts I would rather spent time on research than writing about other peoples research. Will see next year if I continue doing this or not. I'm doing this since January 2009 so it has been a few years.
Opcde ConferenceSamsung confirms it will render the US Note 7 useless with next update since the owners don't seem to care to return the phones to Samsung even tho they would get a replacement device. This is kind of hilarious.
Browser based iOS 9.3.x jailbreak (64bit only) it has been a while.
Chinese company installed secret backdoor on hundreds of thousands of phones
Here is the BLU R1 blind system command execution via Adups from July of this year - anyone think they care? pic.twitter.com/veUMGD8zSy— Tim Strazzere (@timstrazz) November 22, 2016
Recently the topic of SMS 2FA came up again. While I agree that SMS is not the most secure version of 2FA it is far far better then not providing any 2FA mechanism for your service.
Seems like the right ordering, but when deployment is 98% < 2% < .5% < .01% complaining about SMS security is pretty silly. https://t.co/5ex3naa5a5— Alex Stamos (@alexstamos) December 1, 2016
Oxygen 9.0.3 allows to brute force a passcode for any Windows Phone 8 device from its physical dump!
Android system_server Code Loading Bypass
"Root" via dirtyc0w privilege escalation exploit (automation script) / Android (32 bit) Raw
Practical Attacks Against Privacy and Availability in 4G/LTE Mobile Communication Systems (paper)
JTAGing Mobile Phones (from August)
The limitations of Android N Encryption
The fight against Ghost Push continues
BitUnmap: Attacking Android Ashmem
Saving Data: Reducing the size of App Updates by 65% (looks interesting)
More Than 1 Million Google Accounts Breached by Gooligan
Telstra is switching off their GSM network
Qualcomm has a Bug Bounty now
Nintendo has a Bug Bounty now
Secure Rom extraction on iPhone 6s
Android Security Bulletin - December 2016
HackingTeam back for your Androids, now extra insecure!
SunShine 3.4.18 has been released. Bring Support for Android 7.x.x and latest HTC 10 updates
A detailed security assessment on Android Full Disk Encryption (paper)
BitUnmap: Attacking Android Ashmem
Fuzzing Android OMX (slides)
Anonymous web-based SMS
Mobile Network Codes (MNC) for the international identification plan for public networks and subscriptions (According to Recommendation ITU-T E.212 (09/2016))
Call me maybe: Exploiting iOS WebViews to force automatic FaceTime calls
Android Banking Malware Masquerading as Email App Targets German Banks
Second Chinese Firm in a Week Found Hiding Backdoor in Firmware of Android Devices
Powerful backdoor/rootkit found preinstalled on 3 million Android phones
RAGENTEK ANDROID OTA UPDATE MECHANISM VULNERABLE TO MITM ATTACK
New Reliable Android Kernel Root Exploitation Techniques (slides)
Analysis of iOS.GuiInject Adware Library
Android Security Bulletin - November 2016
HelDroid: Dissect Android Apps Looking for Ransomware Functionalities
Rooting Every Android From Extension To Exploitation by Di Shen (slides)
Mobile Espionage in the Wild Pegasus and Nation-State Level Attacks (slides)
The Android Security Center
Technical Analysis of the Pegasus Exploits on iOS (paper)
Just a place to dump the cdma data I collected while at Defcon 2016
CRiOS: Toward Large-Scale iOS Application Analysis (paper)
Exploring LTE security and protocol exploits with open source software and low-cost software radio by Roger Jover (slides)
Your smartphone is a civil rights issue (TED talk)
Receive SMS Online
Android wear MiTM
*droid: Assessment and Evaluation of Android Application Analysis Tools (paper)
Using Google Fi on an iPhone
iOS WebView auto dialer bug
TL;DR: iOS WebViews can be used to automatically call an attacker controlled phone number. The attack can block the phone's UI for a short amount of time and therefore prevent the victim from canceling the call. The bug is an application bug that likely is due to bad OS/framework defaults. One major issue with this vulnerability is that it is really easy to exploit. App developers have to fix their code as soon as possible. The Twitter and LinkedIn iOS apps are vulnerable (other apps might be vulnerable too). Demo videos here: Twitter and LinkedIn (embedded videos are below on this page).
About a week ago (on a Friday) I read an news post [1,2] about a guy who got arrested for accidentally DoSing 911 by creating a web page that automatically dialed 911 when visited it from an iPhone. This was most likely due to a bug with the handling of TEL URI [4,5]. I immediately thought about a bug I reported to Apple in late October 2008 . I couldn't believe this bug has resurfaced so I investigated. The article said something about posting links on Twitter.
On Nov. 6th I updated the bug report to Twitter to add the UI blocking issue (continue reading) and uploaded a video. Today Twitter simply closes the bug as a duplicate without any comment. While this might be a simple duplicate they should have an interest in playing nice and being thankful to those who report bugs they find in their spare time. Because of this action I decided to post the full details of the issue today.
During the weekend I took some time to further investigate the issue. I determined that this might be a general issue with iOS apps the use WebViews to display content. I tested a few popular apps I had installed. Vulnerable apps need a way for users to post web links that will be opened in a WebView inside the app itself. Apps that open links in mobile Safari or Chrome would not be vulnerable (I tested this). One app I tested fairly early was the LinkedIn app since LinkedIn basically is social media for the business context. People can send messages and post updates. Updates usually are text and link. I posted a link and clicked it and yes it dialed my other phone (demo video below).
I wanted to submit the bug to LinkedIn and found that they have a bug bounty program. Unfortunately it was a private bounty and you would only be added if you previously submitted bugs. I tried to get around it but it didn't work. After some thinking I decided to not report it to LinkedIn privately but openly (parallel to this blog post). It is 2016 after all and if they don't want to add me to their program that is their choice. In general I will likely not report bugs outside of a bug bounty program if a private bug bounty program exists.
Another weekend comes I have some time and started playing with the bug again. Actually I started looking at my PoC from 2008 while trying to figure out if I report the bug to LinkedIn or not. After playing around for a bit I more or less get my old PoC working with the Twitter and LinkedIn apps. WOW!
Taking one step backwards. The original bug I reported to Twitter was triggering a phone call by visiting a website that redirect to a TEL URL. One could do this with various techniques such as: http-meta refresh, iframe, setting document.location, window.location, or an HTTP redirect (Location header). This would simply dial a number. The victim would see the dialer and the target number on the screen and of course could just cancel the call by pressing the big red button. Just causing the call is already bad since an unobservant person will be baffled (why is my phone dialing some number).
The beauty of my 2008 bug was that I could block the phone's UI for a few seconds and therefore prevent the user from canceling the call. I managed to abuse exactly the same trick to block the UI that I used in 2008. The trick is to cause the OS to open a second application while the phone is dialing the given number. Opening applications is pretty straight forward, you open a URL that causes the OS to spawn another application. This can be anything from the messages app (via the SMS: URL) or iTunes (via the itms-apps: URL). You can pretty much get any application to launch that has a URI binding. In 2008 I used a SMS URL with a really really long phone number to block the UI thread. My best guess on how this works is that the IPC subsystem actually has difficulties to move several kilobytes of URL data through the various layers into the app and the target app might also not be super happy about really large URLs. I ended-up with the code below. The code uses the combination of meta-refresh tag and window.location to execute the attack. The codes delays setting the window.location by 1.3 seconds to guarantee that the dialer is executed first. The delay cannot be too long otherwise the WebView will not execute the URL handler for launching the messages app. Basically you have to get the timing just right.
The PoC to trigger this bug.
Below two video demonstrations of this attack. You can clearly see that the UI is not responsive for a short amount of time. The time is long enough to make somebody pickup on the other side (especially service hot lines automatically pickup).
Normal good app behavior:
Apps should normally check the URL schema before executing it and show the user a pop-up dialog before executing an app on the device. Some examples are shown below:
Mobile Safari asking before calling the Apple Support number. This is how good apps should behave!
Dropbox showing a warning but not showing the target number. Ok but could be better.
The Yelp app normally behaves like Safari but if you hit it with an HTTP redirect it does not show the target number. I just included this for the fun of it.
App developers should review their use of WebViews to determine if they are vulnerable to this attack. Vulnerable apps need to be fixed. Service providers like Twitter and LinkedIn can inspect links posted to their sites for containing malicious code and prevent those links from being posted to their service.
Apple should change the default behavior of WebViews to exclude execution of TEL URIs and make it an explicit feature to avoid this kind of issues in the future. I reported this issue to Apple.
 Bug Bounty Hunter Launches Accidental DDoS Attack on 911 Systems via iOS Bug (softpedia)
 iPhone hack that threatened emergency 911 system lands teen in jail (ars technica)
 Here my post to full-disclosure in Nov. 2008 after Apple fixed the bug in iOS 3.0 : iPhone Safari phone-auto-dial vulnerability (original date: Nov. 2008)
 Original TEL URI schema RFC2806 URLs for Telephone Calls
 Updated TEL URI schema RFC3966 The tel URI for Telephone Numbers
TL;DR: Google Fi on an iPhone is iMessage plus Google Wifi calling with awesome international coverage.
Google Project Fi is super interesting as it provides an actual low cost alternative to other carriers especially if you travel. The free data-only SIM is also a nice add-on.
Project Fi is exclusively targeting users of Google Nexus Android devices and you actually need one of the supported phones to activate the SIM which can be ordered on the Fi website.
I currently use an iPhone SE (mainly due to the device's tech specs and form-factor - I can't stand phablets!) so I was curious if I can just buy a Google Fi SIM and use it in an iPhone or any other phone actually. Of course I'm not the first person to think about this, but the only decent article on this topic is this one. Sadly most articles that are returned for a search on iPhone Google Fi are just totally useless. Even this article is not good.
I decided to just order Google Fi and a data-only SIM and give it a try. I used a Nexus 5x that I have access to for activating the SIM card. The activation process is really simple. Basically you need to put the SIM card into a compatible phone and install the Google Fi app. Done.
The activated SIM card can be put into any other phone, I tried an iPhone 5c and it just works. You automatically get the APN settings (the mobile data settings) pushed to your phone. Cellular data immediately works! Voice calls work too.
Wifi calling also works, although it (obviously) only works via the Hangout app but it does work. I put my phone into airplane mode and called the number from another phone and yea it rings.
The only service that is a bit unsatisfying is SMS (text messaging). The default option for Google Fi is to send and receive SMS via Google Hangout. Google Hangout exists for iOS and if you login with your Google Account that is associated with your Google Fi service you just install Hangouts and everything just works! If you actually want to use the iOS Messages app you can deactivate SMS via Hangout in the Hangout app on your phone. This will allow you to send and receive SMS via Messages. The only issue here is that incoming SMS messages get some Google specific data attached, as shown below. This is a little annoying but is only on incoming messages (you don't look like an idiot when sending messages to other people). Most of my contacts are on iMessage anyway these days so this is a non issue. Also I'm ok with using Hangouts for SMS since yea iMessage and other messaging apps.
The switch to change between native SMS and Hangout SMS the switch above it does the same for voice calls (to enable Wifi calling).
The broken* incoming SMS, the ~Dgr... is added by Google Fi, this does not show up in Hangouts. Other people have reported that this just went away after short time.
Things that don't work? switching between T-Mobile, Sprint, and US Cellular since this is done via the Google Fi app on Android devices (I actually don't have any idea about this yet).
Altogether Google Fi looks pretty cool and works with an iPhone (besides the hick-up with SMS). iMessage works (it is just an Internet service after all). Wifi calling via Hangouts is nice.
If you are a hardcore iOS/Mac user Google Fi is too much Google for you. I'm a Linux user with an iPhone so Google Fi makes a lot of sense. Desktop calls and SMS via Hangouts is a nice thing to have in addition to iMessage.
Google Fi on an oooold phone (Android 4.0). Hangouts seem to work fine too.
*The data is a BASE64 encoded blob, no obvious data after looking at a bunch of them of an hour or less.
Black Hat EU November, London UK. ARMAGEDDON: HOW YOUR SMARTPHONE CPU BREAKS SOFTWARE-LEVEL SECURITY AND PRIVACY Speaker: Clementine Maurice, Moritz Lipp. DETACH ME NOT - DOS ATTACKS AGAINST 4G CELLULAR USERS WORLDWIDE FROM YOUR DESK Speaker: Bhanu Kotte, Dr. Silke Holtmanns, Siddharth Rao. MOBILE ESPIONAGE IN THE WILD: PEGASUS AND NATION-STATE LEVEL ATTACKS Speaker: Max Bazaliy, Seth Hardy. POCKET-SIZED BADNESS: WHY RANSOMWARE COMES AS A PLOT TWIST IN THE CAT-MOUSE GAME Speaker: Federico Maggi, Stefano Zanero. ROOTING EVERY ANDROID: FROM EXTENSION TO EXPLOITATION Speaker: Di Shen, Jiahong (James) Fang. SIGNING INTO ONE BILLION MOBILE APP ACCOUNTS EFFORTLESSLY WITH OAUTH2.0 Speaker: Ronghai Yang, Wing Cheong Lau. STUMPING THE MOBILE CHIPSET Speaker: Adam Donenfeld. WIFI-BASED IMSI CATCHER Speaker: Piers O'Hanlon, Ravishankar Borgaonkar.The most interesting read this week was The bumpy road towards iPhone 5c NAND mirroring a paper by Sergei Skorobogatov. In this paper he shows how to implement a NAND mirroring attack against an iPhone 5C. The basic idea behind this attack is erase the PIN failure counter between each set of tries to avoid the artificial brute force delay and to avoid data deletion after N failed PINs. The paper goes into great detail on various problems he encountered while implementing the attack. I highly recommend reading this paper. The picture below is taken from this paper.
PacSec Tokyo Japan, October. Demystifying the Secure Enclave Processor by Mathew Solnik.
Google's Project Zero now has an Android "Prize" for achieving RCE on a Nexus device with only knowing it's email address or phone number. Apparently you can't use a BTS (via @jduck) for this attack. Overall this looks interesting, I wonder if anybody is going to claim the money soon. Announcement: Project Zero Prize.
iCloud, iHack, iSpam
Android Premium SMS Warning Message Manipulation
tool to inspect, dump, modify, search and inject libraries into Android processes.
How My Rogue Android App Could Monitor & Brute-force Your App's Sensitive Metadata
APK Signature Scheme v2
Just One Photo Can Silently Hack Millions Of Androids (@TimStrazz)
Parse the Qualcomm DIAG format and convert 2G, 3G and 4G radio messages to Osmocom GSMTAP for analysis in wireshark and other utilities.
PEGASUS iOS Kernel Vulnerability Explained by Stefan Esser
Undocumented Patched Vulnerability in Nexus 5X Allowed for Memory Dumping via USB
VB2016 preview: Mobile Applications: a Backdoor into Internet of Things?
Hiding root with suhide
Xiaomi Can Silently Install Any App On Your Android Phone Using A Backdoor
Reverse Engineering Xiaomi's Analytics app
A Case of Misplaced Trust: How a Third-Party App Store Abuses Apple's Developer Enterprise Program to Serve Adware
File-Based Encryption in Android 7
Linux Security Summit Videos a lot is Android relevant
Harvesting Inconsistent Security Configurations in Custom Android ROMs via Differential Analysis (paper)
suhide v0.51 released
Introducing BLESuite and BLE-Replay: Python Tools for Rapid Assessment of Bluetooth Low Energy Peripherals
Samsung Android Security Updates - September
A Survey on Android ELF Malware
Keeping Android safe: Security enhancements in Nougat
Nexus Device Downloads via jduck @ droidsec
Black Hat USA Las Vegas. DEMYSTIFYING THE SECURE ENCLAVE PROCESSOR by Tarjei Mandt and Mathew Solnik. ADAPTIVE KERNEL LIVE PATCHING: AN OPEN COLLABORATIVE EFFORT TO AMELIORATE ANDROID N-DAY ROOT EXPLOITS by Tao Wei and Yulong Zhang. CAN YOU TRUST ME NOW? AN EXPLORATION INTO THE MOBILE THREAT LANDSCAPE by Josh Thomas. SAMSUNG PAY: TOKENIZED NUMBERS, FLAWS AND ISSUES by Salvador Mendoza.
AppSec EU Rome. Don't Touch Me That Way. by David Lindner and Jack Mannino. Automated Mobile Application Security Assessment with MobSF by Ajin Abraham. Why Hackers Are Winning The Mobile Malware Battle - Bypassing Malware Analysis Techniques by Yair Amit.
Hack in The Box Amsterdam, NL. SANDJACKING: PROFITING FROM IOS MALWARE by Chilik Tamir. FORCING A TARGETED LTE CELLPHONE INTO AN EAVESDROPPING NETWORK by Lin Huang. ADAPTIVE ANDROID KERNEL LIVE PATCHING by Tim Xia and Yulong Zhang. COMMSEC TRACK: INSPECKAGE - ANDROID PACKAGE INSPECTOR by Antonio Martins.
Area41 When providing a native mobile application ruins the security of your existing Web solution by Jeremy Matos. IMSecure - Attacking VoLTE and other Stuff by Hendrik Schmidt & Brian Butterly. Reversing Internet of Things from Mobile Applications by Axelle Apvrille.
Recon Montreal, CA. Breaking Band by Nico Golde and Daniel Komaromy. Hardware-Assisted Rootkits and Instrumentation: ARM Edition by Matt Spisak
This was a long break, I was covered in work and had other things to do. But I'm not giving up this blog. Sadly I missed a bunch of conferences earlier this year. Especially CanSecWest and Troopers/TelSecDay. TelSecDay looked really awesome this year! Sad to have missed it.
Work with me and other awesome people at Square we are looking for a bunch of different mobile security related people. Android and iOS!
For those who are interested in TrustZone or TrustZone implementations check out: War of the Worlds - Hijacking the Linux Kernel from QSEE This blog has a lot of awesome research on TrustZone and Qualcomm's implementation.
60 Minutes: shows how easily your phone can be hacked. As I said earlier on Twitter, this is as good as it gets on TV. All of the people on the show are pros (know all of them personally!). Of course if you are an expert yourself you will complain about anything shown on TV ;-)
Dilbert gets it:
Related to the iPhone will be bricked if the clock is set back too far.
AppMon, GreaseMonkey for Android and iOS
Mobile Security Bullshit Bingo
CVE-2015-1805 root tool, Android Sony
Hacking Samsung Galaxy via Modem interface exposed via USB
Overly restrictive SELinux filesystem permissions in Android N
Android IOMX getConfig/getParameter Information Disclosure
Metaphor - Stagefright with ASLR bypass
Brussels police were forced to use WhatsApp during attacks
eMMC backdoor leading to bootloader unlock on Samsung Galaxy Devices
Android rooting bug opens Nexus phones to "permanent device compromise"
You can install a GSM network with a single command now - $sudo apt-get install gsm-network
Android Installer Hijacking Vulnerability Could Expose Android Users to Malware
How to Build Your Own Rogue GSM BTS for Fun and Profit (using a BladeF)
Multiple vulnerabilities found in Quanta LTE routers (backdoor, backdoor accounts, RCE, weak WPS ...)
Nexus Security Bulletin-April 2016
Android Security Bulletin-May 2016
Dalvik Virtual Execution with SmaliVM
Releasing the Fairphone 2 Open Operating System
Calling all Mobile Researchers!
Analysis of CVE-2016-2414 - Out-of-Bound Write Denial of Service Vulnerability in Android Minikin Library
[CVE-2016-2443] Qualcomm MSM debug fs kernel arbitrary write (Nexus 5, Nexus 7 2013 and maybe other models)
Android is moving to enforcing storage verification at runtime (via @copperheadsec)
Modem interface exposed via USB (samsung)
Hey your parcel looks bad - Fuzzing and Exploiting parcel-ization vulnerabilities in Android (slides)
iovyroot - (temp) root tool
Linux Kernel Exploitation on Android
ss7MAPer - A SS7 pen testing toolkit
Beating Expectations: Android Security Patching for PRIV
Pwn a Nexus device with a single vulnerability (slides)
Exploring the Physical Address Space on iOS
CanSecWest Vancouver, Canada. Don't Trust Your Eye: Apple Graphics Is Compromised! - Liang Chen + Marco Grassi. Having fun with secure messengers and Android Wear - Artem Chaykin. Pwn a Nexus device with a single vulnerability - Guang Gong.
Troopers Heidelberg, Germany. QNX: 99 Problems but a Microkernel ain't one! Georgi Geshev, Alex Plaskett.
Looks like I will go to very few conferences this year.
We finally published our paper on Android application analysis support using intelligent GUI stimulation. The work CuriousDroid: Automated User Interface Interaction for Android Application Analysis Sandboxes uses / enhances Andrubis.
Excellent post on Apple vs FBI by Dan Guido: Apple can comply with the FBI court order
BlackBerry powered by Android Security Bulletin - March 2016
Nexus Security Bulletin - March 2016
Attack on Zygote: a new twist in the evolution of mobile threats
How to FBI-proof your iPhone
Reverse Engineering Samsung S6 Modem
Security Analysis of Wearable Fitness Devices (Fitbit)
Practical Attacks Against Privacy and Availability in 4G/LTE Mobile Communication Systems
GPS hacking (PART 1)
How does Dalvik handle 'this' registers?
Pirated iOS App Store's Client Successfully Evaded Apple iOS Code Review
FileSystem Monitor Tool For iOS and Android
Scammers use mobile POS terminals to scan people cards via NFC (paypass,paywave etc) technology without them knowing
Android: Calling getpidcon for One Way Binder Transactions Returns Wrong Security Context
Network Security Policy configuration for Android apps
[Xposed module] Disable device compatibility check
The ARMv8-A architecture and its ongoing development
Android Secure Coding Free PDF Book
Decoding Syscalls in ARM64
Adafruit Bluefruit LE Sniffer – Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE 4.0)