Detecting Reverse Engineering with Canaries

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About Me

- Security since ~1994 (hard to tell)
  - BS, MS, PhD in computer science (all focused on security)
- Early work: mobile app development (1997 for PalmOS)
- Worked a lot on MMS (2005-2006) and SMS (2009-2011) security
- Involved in several books on smartphone security
- Worked at mobile device manufacturers and mobile app security team
- Spent (a lot of) time at academic and industry research labs
- Also worked on: Windows desktop app security, anti ransomware, and consumer electronics security
- I find and report issues to manufacturers

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Disclaimer!

- I don’t claim to have invented any of this!
- This talk is about using existing techniques for something newish
- The idea likely is already used by people who don’t talk about it!
- I’m not saying that reverse engineering is bad or malicious by definition!
- Also: I don’t (try/want to) sell you anything!
- My views/opinions don’t reflect the views/opinions of GM/GM Cruise LLC
Goals

● Reverse Engineering vs Security

● The idea behind RE-Canaries

● How to make RE-Canaries work in the real world

● Fun and Profit
Reverse engineering, also called back engineering, is the processes of extracting knowledge or design information from anything man-made and reproducing it or reproducing anything based on the extracted information.\[1\]:3 The process often involves disassembling something (a mechanical device, electronic component, computer program, or biological, chemical, or organic matter) and analyzing its components and workings in detail.
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Reverse Engineering Goals

- General understanding of how something works
  - “I just want to know how this works”

- Security
  - Discover vulnerabilities
    - Design
    - Implementation

- Re-implement “proprietary” software components
  - e.g., alternative client for networked service

- Determine possible IP violation (intellectual property)
Reverse Engineering Why Would You Care?

“The first step of attacking a target is recon!” -- Brandon Edwards aka DrRaid

- Reverse engineering the target software is mandatory/basic reconnaissance
- Knowing this (about your software) gives you a strategic advantage
  - Prepare countermeasures
  - Collect evidence
Anything (interesting) will be Reverse Engineered

You don’t want to find out about it from a talk announcement or the news
Anything (interesting) will be Reverse Engineered

you and your software are being targeted

You don’t want to find out about it from a talk announcement or the news
Software RE Techniques: Static Analysis

- Analyze the software on disk (without executing it)
  - Translate code
    - Assembly
    - High level language pseudocode

- Lot of tools (there is a market for this)
  - Disassembler
  - Binary Differencing
  - Code Fingerprinting

- Program understanding is an entire research field
  - Academic & Industry
RE using Dynamic Analysis

- Execute code and observe behavior
  - System calls, network traffic, file system activity
  - Debug or instrument software (monitor code that does not interact with the OS)

- Again a lot of tooling
  - Specialized debuggers and instrumentation tools
  - Sandboxes to execute code in controlled environment (e.g., malware analysis)
  - Also network traffic analysis...

![strace](image1.png)
![Pin](image2.png)
![VMRay](image3.png)
![Debugger](image4.png)
Static vs. Dynamic *(really basic comparison!)*

- **Dynamic analysis is much faster → results are not as detailed**
  - Can be *detected and *prevented by the analyzed target (*to a certain degree*)
    - e.g., vm & sandbox detection, anti-debugging

- **Static analysis takes more time → better results**
  - Protections such as code obfuscation can make this very hard and time consuming
  - Can’t be detected since the target software is not being executed, no network communication
Reverse Engineering is HARD

- In reality, both static and dynamic analysis will be used together!

- Very time consuming and tedious, also want to save time → time is money

- People like to cut corners
  - Developer uses a software library
  - Revere Engineer...
    - what libraries are being used?
    - what is this thing?
    - Did somebody already reverse this software?
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    - what is this thing?
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I DON'T ALWAYS REVERSE ENGINEER...

WHEN I DO I GOOGLE IF SOMEONE DID BEFORE ME
Can we detect the reverse engineer when he is cutting corners?
Reverse Engineering … an Example

...let’s say a wifi-router

- Download firmware update or extract firmware from the device
- Load it into your favorite disassembler

Just an example!
```
lw    $a0, 0xB8($s0)
la    $t9, strstr
jalr  $t9 ; strstr
lw    $gp, 0x3B8+saved_gp($sp)
la    $a1, 0x470000
addiu $a1, (aXmlset_roodk_0 - 0x470000) # "xmlset_roodkcableoj28840ybtide"
bnez  $v0, end
li    $v1, 1
```
http://www.devttys0.com/2013/10/reverse-engineering-a-d-link-backdoor/
Xmlset_roodkcableoj28840ybtide

Xmlset_roodkcableoj28840ybtide - WikiDevi
https://wikidevi.com/wiki/Xmlset_roodkcableoj28840ybtide
xmlset_roodkcableoj28840ybtide is a known backdoor on some Alpha ... change browser's user agent string to "xmlset_roodkcableoj28840ybtide" (no quotes).

A backdoor present in D-Link devices allows to bypass ...
securityaffairs.co.wordpress/18645/hacking/d-link-backdoor.html
Oct 13, 2013 - Craig decided to search the code "xmlset_roodkcableoj28840ybtide" on Google and discovered traces of it only in one Russian forum post from ...

#xmlset_roodkcableoj28840ybtide hashtag on Twitter
https://twitter.com/hashtag/xmlset_roodkcableoj28840ybtide
See Tweets about #xmlset_roodkcableoj28840ybtide on Twitter. See what people are saying and join the conversation.

Security Vulnerability: Check Your D-Link Backdoor — Global Knowledge
blog.globalknowledge.com/2014/.../security-vulnerability-check-your-d-link-backdo...
Jan 15, 2014 - The backdoor was simply a user agent — specifically "xmlset_roodkcableoj28840ybtide" — that was hard coded in the device firmware to skip the ...

Control panel backdoor found in D-Link home routers - El Reg
https://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/10/13/dlink_routers_have_admin_backdoor/
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Reverse Engineering a D-Link Backdoor

By Craig | October 12, 2013 | Embedded Systems, Security

All right. It’s Saturday night. I have no date, a two-liter bottle of Shasta and my all-Rush mix-tape…let’s hack.

On a whim I downloaded firmware v1.13 for the DIR-100 revA. Binwalk quickly found and extracted a SquashFS file system, and soon I had the firmware’s web server (/bin/webs) loaded into IDA:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Length</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>String</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>rodata0046..000000010</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>initgroups - %m</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rodata0046..00000000C</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>setuid - %m</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rodata0046..00000003A</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>started as root without requesting chroot(), warning only</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rodata0046..00000001F</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>fdwatch initialization failure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rodata0046..000000026</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>out of memory allocating a connecttab</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rodata0046..00000000D</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>fdwatch - %m</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rodata0046..00000000B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>**.cgl</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rodata0046..00000000A</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>user</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rodata0046..000000009</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>iso-8859-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rodata0046..000000008</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>htttpd-alphabetworks/2.23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rodata0046..000000007</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>-nori</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rodata0046..000000006</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>-no</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rodata0046..000000005</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>-nos</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rodata0046..000000004</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>-nog</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rodata0046..000000003</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>usage: %s [-C configfile] [-p part] [-d dir] [-r</td>
<td>nor] [-s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rodata0046..000000002</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rodata0046..000000001</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rodata0046..000000000</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is the final `strcmp` however, which proves a bit more compelling:

```
  lw $a0, 0x00000000($sp)
  la $t9, strstr
  jalr $t9, strstr
  nop
  lw $gp, 0x3B8+saved_gp($sp)
  nop
  la $a1, 0x470000
  nop
  addiu $a1, ($xmlset_roodcableo - 0x470000) # "xmlset_roodcableo28840ytibre"
  beqz $v0, end
  li $v1, 1
```

An interesting string comparison in `alpha_auth_check`

This is performing a `strcmp` between the string pointer at offset 0x00 inside the `http_request_t` structure and the string “xmlset_roodcableo28840ytibre”; if the strings match, the `check_login` function call is skipped and `alpha_auth_check` returns 1 (authentication OK).

A quick Google for the "xmlset_roodcableo28840ytibre" string turns up only a single Russian forum post from a few years ago, which notes that this is an “interesting line” inside the /bin/webs binary. I’d have to agree.

So what is this mystery string getting compared against? If we look back in the call tree, we see that the `http_request_t` structure pointer is passed around by a few functions:
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So this guy searched the web...

- ...for this really **unique string**
  - Seems like this was one of the first things he did

- Only **one single search result** at the time
  - This means he would checkout that result for sure!
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- Only **one single search result** at the time
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- What if this site was run by the manufacturer?
  - If they monitored access to this specific page they know somebody looked at their software
Detecting Reverse Engineering \textit{(side effects)}

...seems to be absolutely possible

The idea:

Embed Canary Tokens into software to help detect reverse engineering
What are Canary Tokens?

- Unique identifiers that can be embedded in different places
  - If they are touched you get an alert

- OLD concept
  - Fake city in a map to detect if map was copied from you

- Also known as: honeytokens

Canary Tokens

- Spitzner (2003), Spafford & Kim (1994)
- Not a new Concept.
- City of “Agloe”?

http://www.symantec.com/connect/articles/honeytokens-other-honeypot
http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2114&context=estech

Bring Back Honeypots by the guys from Thinkst (Black Hat USA 2015)
Canary/Honey Tokens already used in lot of Places

- Honeypot/honeynet → scan or login will trigger alarm
- Database row with trigger → read whole database will trigger alarm
- User account with (no privileges) weak password → login will trigger
- Canarytokens.org → open exfiled doc calls home and triggers alarm
Canarytokens.org aka Inspiration for this Work

- URL token
- DNS token
- Web bug (aka 1x1 pixel image)
- Documents...
RE-Canary

- Token embedded into software to help detect reverse engineering
  - Unique token (e.g., SDFDkjd983743223)
  - Multiple tokens: tokens in different components of the software

- Hope somebody triggers the canary by activating the token
  - e.g., web search for the token to gain more information about the target software

- Defensive tool to notify and alert you about “attacks”
  - Attacks against you and your software
RE-Canary cont.

- Help you determine how much your adversary might know
- Which of your defenses are gone
  - Time to add new ones?
- Prepare for adversarial action
  - Alert your SecOps people
- Create log trail for legal case
  - Compromise
  - **IP violation** (more than just security!)
RE-Canaries: an Approach to Level the Playing Field

- Dynamic analysis can be detected by the software manufacturer
  - IF software uses network and network access is not restricted (call home, crash report, ...)
    - Can’t be avoided in many circumstances

- Static analysis doesn’t execute software → no network traffic
  - No: logs, crash dumps, ...
  - No interaction with your infrastructure!

- RE-Canaries bring the attacker back to your infrastructure
  - You can observe what he is doing and take defensive action!
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*Your adversary is playing a Capture the Flag (CTF) game, that you set up, without knowing it!*
RE-Canary: Information Provided *(potential)*

- Action performed (assuming individual tokens for things)
- Date/Time: when did this happen
- IP address (location?)
- Browser information (for web-based canaries)
  - browser, OS, language, …
**Canaries Invert the Attacker-Defender Problem**

- **We are used to think like this:**
  - Defender has to get everything right 100% of the time
  - Attacker has to get lucky once!

- **With canaries:**
  - Attacker has to avoid 100% of the canaries
  - Defender has to get lucky once!

*Canaries detect and not defend (especially RE canaries!)*
Application Areas
SOFTWARE
SOFTWARE EVERYWHERE
Devices: Consumer Electronics, Medical, Industrial,..

- All the chips run software
  - Software made by the manufacturer, you, or 3rd party

- With source code access
  - Canaries are easily added

- Binary blob
  - Reverse engineer and determine canaries (what would you search for?)
  - Attacker has to go thru the effort of opening device and extracting the software from the chip
  - Your security team gets the vendor blob from your hardware team
Example
Example

dlopen/dlsym canary

1. try to load library
2. if 1: lookup function
3. if 2: call function
4. if 3: log result

would normally do nothing!
Example

dlopen/dlsym canary

1. try to load library
2. if 1: lookup function
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4. if 3: log result

would normally do nothing!
Example... strings ('-e L' will print wchar strings!)

Nothing useful
Example... strace

```
open("libcryptolizer...")
```
Example… walk-through

- Output of ‘strings’ is useless (god, we don’t care about you running strings!)
- strace delivers a filename: libcryptolizer_version42.so

- Additional dynamic or static analysis delivers two additional tokens
  - Function name: CryptTestWithRealSystemKeys_KeyResultLog
  - Output filename: expanded_key_encoded_4output.xml

- Analysis takes extra time depending on skill, but time was spent!
Bingo!

libcryptolizer

version: 42
proprietary crypto library for implementing countermeasures.

Platforms:
Windows: libcryptolizer_v42.dll
Linux: libcryptolizer_version43.so
OSX: libcryptolizer_v42.dylib

API reference:

CryptInitialize
args:
  * char *alg
returns:
  int

CryptEncrypt_with_ECB
args:
  * unsigned char *in
  * size_t in_len
  * unsigned char *out
returns:
  int

CryptTestWithRealSystemKeys_KeyResultLog
args:
  * char **result
returns:
  int

CryptClearMemoryBuffers
args:
  * n/a
returns:
  int
Example 2

- Java reflection is often used for obfuscation
- Use it as a canary

```java
Class<?> cls = Class.forName(deobfuscate(s: "sdfkl2u38723dfsjnds8923y"));
Method m = cls.getMethod(deobfuscate(s: "dfsdfs9238320932klj"), ...parameterTypes: null, null);
m.invoke(o: null);
```

- Put in try-catch block and do nothing if class/method not found
- Unique class/method name as the RE-Canary token
Some Words on String Obfuscation

● Problem: many things rely on strings, strings show a lot about functionality
● Goal: make strings “go away”

● Many many obfuscation techniques
  ○ Encrypt strings in binary and decrypt at runtime:
    ■ send(sock, STRING); → send(sock, decrypt(ENC_STRING, KEY));
  ○ Transform (e.g., base64, ROT13, 1-byte XOR)
  ○ Build string: string is stored as code, function builds and returns string
    (Malware provides a lot of interesting examples for this)
String Obfuscation cont.

- **Real simple string obfuscation**
  - Ideas taken from malware
- **Can be automated during build**

```python
def obfuscate(s, len):
    for i in range(len):
        s[i] = s[i] ^ 0x11
    return s
```

```
collin@box:~$ python make_stackstr.py libcryptolizer.so libc
static char* makestr_libc()
{
static char buf[18];
buf[0] = 'l';
buf[1] = 'i';
buf[2] = 'b';
buf[3] = 'c';
buf[4] = 'r';
buf[5] = 'y';
buf[6] = 'p';
buf[7] = 't';
buf[8] = 'o';
buf[9] = 'l';
buf[10] = 'i';
buf[11] = 'z';
buf[12] = 'e';
buf[13] = 'r';
buf[14] = 'e';
buf[15] = 's';
buf[16] = 'o';
buf[17] = 0;
return buf;
```
Word on Code Obfuscation

- Code obfuscation is commonly done to protect IP and to harden security code
  - Many products out there

- Compiler extension obfuscates code without developer doing anything special
  - Configure obfuscation level (blow up binary size by x%)

- Obfuscated code hardens string obfuscation

- Add RE-Canary to code that gets obfuscated to detect people breaking the obfuscation!
RE-Canaries Measure your Adversary’s Progress

- Multiple canary layers (obfuscation and hardening)
  - Canary from `strings software.exe` vs encrypted canary extracted from obfuscated code

- Time between alerts from different canaries
  - Canary 9879873232 triggered at 01/03/2017
  - Canary 8789722322 triggered at 04/13/2017
  - Canary 7672672643 triggered at 04/26/2017

- Maybe create canaries that look different depending on discovery technique
  - Different tools, dynamic vs static analysis, ...
RE-Canary Types...
I think we covered String Canaries!
API-Endpoints / URL Canaries

\[ u = \text{URL("https://api.mulliner.net/service/auth\_no\_2fa")} \]

Anybody who hits the specific path triggers the canary
Hostname (DNS) Canary

u = URL(“https://ds3klfjd3s4f3ldsdnal.3blabs.com”)

Resolving the IP address for the host will trigger the canary
Symbol Canary

- Shared libraries have exported symbols
- Add unique symbol
- Similar to dlopen/reflection idea but actually adding it to your shared library
- Webpage with symbol (special version of library documentation)
- C++ name mangling ;-)
(AWS) Credentials (in Mobile Apps)

- Hardcoded credentials are (sadly) a common thing
  - Obfuscate them to not be publicly shamed for doing it!

We reverse engineered 16k apps, here’s what we found

In Nov’16, we created an online tool to reverse engineer any android app to look for secrets. This tool was built because of an internal need—we were constantly required to reverse engineer apps for our customers to examine it from a security standpoint. We felt the process could be automated to a point where we could create a web based tool which could be used by anyone. Couple of months after releasing it, users have reverse engineered approximately 16,000 apps and here are some of the interesting findings.

![Chart showing apps with key/secret and apps with "secret"](chart.png)

Your AWS key token is active!

Copy this credential pair to your clipboard to use as desired:

```
[Default]
Access key Id: AKIAIUTLE53X0Y3MNICA
Secret Access Key: v1d3p8HagvrBsxVP9p8ft+o2Gxwa0Vh6G0Yq2m9m
```

Download your AWS Creds

This canarytoken is triggered when someone uses this credential pair to access AWS programmatically (through the API).

canarytokens.org
Resource Canary

- Application packages contain resources alongside with code
  - e.g., APK, Jar
- Add file-based canary to app package
  - PDF, docx, html
- Poking around and opening files will trigger the canary
RE-Canary Properties

- **Strings → web search**
  - Via intermediate (search engine), could avoid triggering your alarm (e.g., view cached page)

- **API-endpoint, URL, credentials**
  - Connect to (YOUR) infrastructure and therefore guaranteed to trigger your alarms

- **Canary files (e.g., documents from canarytokens.org)**
  - Require network connectivity to trigger alarm (can be avoided easily)
    - but adds another layer of obfuscation
Canary Trigger Deployment
Webpages...

- Fake API documentation
- Basically a site that just contains tokens
Fake “Blog”

- Sites like blogspot help you to mask your identity (not important for canaries)
  - Load content from your site to alert you
    - image
    - javascript

Not actually fake!
The Canarytokens.org Way

- Monitor your DNS

- Add “canaried” API-endpoint for your web services
  - Speak to your development team :)

- Create canary user account
  - No privileges!
Adwords

- Register token as an adword
- Automatic notification if searched for (without running a token page)

Bring Back Honeypots by the guys from Thinkst (Black Hat USA 2015)
Adding RE-Canaries to your Software
RE-Canaries and your Software

● More than one canary, different modules
  ○ You want to bait your adversary more than once

● Components
  ○ Security/protection/licensing
  ○ Secret sauce (your IP)
  ○ Places where they don’t stick out too much

● Don’t obfuscate your canaries if that makes them look super special
  ○ If the rest of your strings are plain text your canaries should be plain text too
  ○ People are lazy but not stupid
RE-Canaries and your Software Lifecycle

- Every release with a fresh set of canaries → detect what version is analyzed
  - Could be easy to diff, depending on the obfuscation

- Provide individual builds to customers
  - Individual canary → who of them loves your software just a bit too much

- Don’t change the canary at download (don’t binary patch app on the way out)
  - Will break integrity checks (such as file hash) also easy to find and diff

- Automate
  - Record canaries information at build time and “deploy” them at a later time
  - Tasks likely done by different teams
Software Already in the Field?

- You know your software (you have the source!)
- Determine what could make a good canary
- If you have any kind of obfuscation or hardening don’t forget to pick a canary inside the obfuscated parts
- Look at your software with a disassembler!
Dead Canaries

- Canary that constantly triggers
  - Was to easy to find (try to avoid this in the first place!)
  - Collision with something that is not a canary

- Just kill it!
  - Don’t alert, just ignore it → your ops people will thank you
Further Ideas and Notes...
Avoiding Detection via RE-Canaries *(attacker’s view)*

- Hiding your actions is pretty hard to impossible
  - Don’t search, only use specific search engine, only look at results and don’t visit result page
  - Non web-based tokens make this hard (e.g., API-endpoint canary or credential canary)

- Hide origin of search (VPN, Tor, etc..)
  - Easy, likely done but you can get lucky
Building RE-Canaries for 3rd-Party Software

- You probably use and rely on software made by someone else
- You would be negatively impacted if that software is targeted
  - I does have bugs! But not necessarily known bugs!
- You could create 3rd-party RE-canaries for that software to get notified if somebody is looking at it very closely
  - You will need to find interesting unique strings in that software
- You should probably search for those strings before creating a token website
Firmware and RE-Canaries

- Extracting or dumping the firmware often is the hardest part!
- No need to obfuscate!
  - Just add some “unique strings”

http://jcjc-dev.com/2016/06/08/reversing-huawei-4-dumping-flash/
Security Nihilism

Ve believe zat nothing...
ist secure enough vor ze real world, Lebowski!

[1] Flickr user Joe Goldberg CC BY-SA 2.0

Building Security at Scale - Yahoo (Alex Stamos, 2014)
Security Nihilism

- This is just a cute trick and not a security solution!

“Non-obvious protections can increase the chance of catching an attacker in time.” --Alex Stamos (2014)

- Adversaries know about this technique and will not fall for it!
  - Do they really?

- So you are saying your adversary is just going to stop searching the web? 😂 😂 😂

“Forcing an adversary to expend resources and risk detection is a valid goal.” --Alex Stamos (2014)
Summary and Conclusions

● RE-Canaries can help you to keep up with your adversaries
  ○ No rocket science, this is easy stuff!

● Universal application
  ○ Desktop apps, mobile, embedded software and firmware

● Canaries provide information, they don’t add protection or security
  ○ You have to have a plan what to do when a canary is triggered

● Help to level playing field: brings the attacker to the environment you control
  ○ Inverts the Attacker-Defender Problem (you just need to get lucky once!)
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Collin Mulliner

www.mulliner.org/collin
Cruise is hiring!

https://getcruise.com/careers
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